My Question for Dr. Yandell

My good friend Andy Naselli is sitting on the front row watching and live blogging the debate. He asked me if I wanted to ask a question, so I sent this:

If the Son is necessarily the Son and the Father is necessarily not the Son, then the Son is essentially the Son and the Father is essentially not the Son. Thus the Son is essentially different from the Father. Must you not deny homoousion on the basis of your own premises?

This parallels the central argument that Drs. Yandell and McCall were making—and shows its weakness:

If the Son is necessarily subordinate to the Father, then the Son is essentially subordinate to the Father. Thus, the Son is essentially different from the Father, which entails a denial of homoousion.

Unfortunately, Dr. Yandell didn’t understand the question. But it is one that needs to be addressed.

Neither he nor Tom shows how their position—on their own premises—can account for any necessary differences without denying homoousion, because, they argue, all necessary differences are essential differences.

They are left with three choices:

1. Deny homoousion.
2. Deny that there are any necessary differences among Father, Son, and Spirit.
3. Withdraw their argument.

I’d suggest #3, but they must choose at least one.

Update 1: Nick understands the force of my question.

Update 2: I develop the argument more thoroughly in my next post: Does Eternal Subordination Entail a Denial of Homoousion?

Update 3: Replaced my misuse of homoousian, which typically refers to someone who believes in homoousion, with the more appropriate homoousion.

Update 4: The discussion has continued over on James Gordon’s blog, Conquering Thirst.

1. 

   Nick Norelli says:

   October 9, 2008 at 8:24 pm

   I just wrote some scattered thoughts on the debate on my blog and made reference to your question. If you could check it out and see if I understood you correctly then I’d appreciate it. Thanks.

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2. 

   James Gordon says:

   October 11, 2008 at 6:54 am

   I think it is clear that your question asked to Dr. Yandell on Thursday night is fatally unconvincing as a counter-example due to its clumsy phrasing. As you noticed in your post dealing with your more extensive response, you left out a key component for a question that would coherently challenge the position of McCall/Yandell.

   So, if you mean Dr. Yandell did not “understand” the question, meaning he did not understand how it could have possibly been an objection to his position, then I think you are right. The way you phrased the question, leaving out the possible worlds language, exhibited a drastic misunderstanding of his position, making it difficult for him to respond since it in no way entailed a denial of his position. On the other hand, as confirmed by Dr. Yandell, he did not “understand” the question because he did not hear it being asked sufficiently, as evidenced by his request to have the question repeated.

   I am having difficulty piecing together your understanding of the McCall/Yandell argument because you have changed the phrasing of your question as well as your assessment of their argument several times. However, a response is forthcoming nonetheless.

   I think that McCall/Yandell do show how their position—on their own premises—can account for necessary differences in the persons of the Trinity without denying homoousian. Furthermore, they argue do that all necessary differences are essential differences, because, as a basic philosophical idea that would be covered in any Metaphysics 101 class, it is true. Necessary difference entails essential/ontological difference.

   Moreover, your question should have been directed to Dr. McCall. Dr. Yandell’s argument did not focus on the premises about which you were questioning him.

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3. 

   Phil Gons says:

   October 11, 2008 at 8:48 am

   Thanks for the comment, James. My responses follow the quoted portions of your comment below.

   I think it is clear that your question asked to Dr. Yandell on Thursday night is fatally unconvincing as a counter-example due to its clumsy phrasing. As you noticed in your post dealing with your more extensive response, you left out a key component for a question that would coherently challenge the position of McCall/Yandell.

   Absolutely false. The original phrasing of my question is perfectly legitimate. It simply omits the first premise, which was unnecessary to establish the argument. Once you get to the language of necessity, which is where I started in my original question, it is unnecessary to speak of “all possible worlds.” My question stands perfectly on its own so long as you are in agreement with the first premise, which both Yandell and McCall are. So it is your objection to my question is that “fatally unconvincing.”

   I am having difficulty piecing together your understanding of the McCall/Yandell argument because you have changed the phrasing of your question as well as your assessment of their argument several times.

   Please show me were I changed both my “phrasing” and my “assessment” of their argument “several times.” Again, this is utterly false. I changed the phrasing in the first line of the fuller argument once, and acknowledged as much, but I was assuming its presence in my argument all along. The omission required nothing else to change in anything I had written. I never changed my assessment.

   However, a response is forthcoming nonetheless.

   I look forward to it, because I was never given one when corresponding with Tom over the last several weeks prior to the debate.

   I think that McCall/Yandell do show how their position—on their own premises—can account for necessary differences in the persons of the Trinity without denying homoousian.

   Where? I’d love to see how.

   Furthermore, they argue do [sic] that all necessary differences are essential differences, because, as a basic philosophical idea that would be covered in any Metaphysics 101 class, it is true. Necessary difference entails essential/ontological difference.

   If you read my fuller post, you’ll see that I don’t challenge the legitimacy of this premise. I conclude that it is misguided in its application because it confuses the shared essence with the individual essences or personal properties.

   Moreover, your question should have been directed to Dr. McCall. Dr. Yandell’s argument did not focus on the premises about which you were questioning him.

   I agree that Dr. McCall would have been the better recipient of the question. That was a poor choice on my part. However, both used the argument. And Dr. Yandell had just reiterated it prior to the Q&A. In hindsight I should have directed it to Tom, since he already understood the force of the objection and as of yet has not responded to it.

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4. 

   James Gordon says:

   October 11, 2008 at 7:40 pm

   Phil,

   You can see my complete response to your question here. I basically argue that, per your request, that the Yandell/McCall position sufficiently meets the objections of his counter-example.

   God bless,

   James Gordon

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5. 

   Phil Gons says:

   October 11, 2008 at 7:46 pm

   I basically argue that, per your request, that the Yandell/McCall position sufficiently meets the objections of his counter-example.

   James, looks like a little too much copying and pasting going on. I assume the “his” refers to me, correct?

   At any rate, I look forward to reading your response, and perhaps responding in due time.

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6. 

   James Gordon says:

   October 11, 2008 at 7:58 pm

   Yes, it refers to you. Sorry about the typo. I look forward to your response.

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