By Andrew David Naselli and Philip R. Gons
Originally published as a chapter in One God in Three Persons: Unity of Essence, Distinction of Persons, Implications for Life, edited by Bruce A. Ware and John Starke (Wheaton: Crossway, 2015), 197–215. Read the published version (PDF).
See also the companion page of definitions and proponents in the debate.
§ 1. Introduction
The notion of hierarchy in the immanent Trinity evokes no small controversy among evangelicals today,1 but the reason runs deeper than a concern to defend orthodox trinitarianism. Behind the Trinity debate we find complementarians and egalitarians clashing about the roles of men and women in the church and the home. What started as an exegetical debate over biblical texts about the relationship between men and women has turned into a theological and philosophical debate about the inner life of the eternal Trinity.
The heart of the gender debate has become the heart of the Trinity debate: can a person—divine or human—be equal in essence and necessarily subordinate in role to another person? Complementarians insist that women are necessarily subordinate to men in their role—in the contexts of marriage and the church—while being equal to them in essence. Egalitarians argue that such a claim defies simple logic.2 Complementarians turn to the relationship between the Father and the Son, in which they find an analogy that seems to refute the egalitarian’s objection. The Son is eternally and necessarily under the authority of the Father and will apparently remain so even after the Father restores all things (1 Cor 15:28), yet the Son is equally God and shares with the Father the one divine essence. If in the Trinity full equality and necessary subordination can coexist in complete harmony, why not also in human gender relations?
Like the gender debate, the Trinity debate has gone through various stages. It, too, began as an exegetical debate, turned into a theological debate, and from there became a historical debate.3 Recently some have tried to end the debate on philosophical grounds.4 This chapter evaluates the successfulness of this most recent move.5
1.1. Indentifying the Sides
Two main viewpoints have emerged in the current Trinity debate. The first holds that the Son is eternally and necessarily subordinate to the Father, not in terms of his deity, but in his role in relationship to the Father.6 We will refer to this position as eternal functional subordination (EFS). The second holds that the Father and Son are completely equal in all non-contingent ways: all subordination is voluntary, arbitrary, and temporary.7 We will refer to this position as eternal functional equality (EFE). Both acknowledge a relationship of authority and subordination between the Father and the Son. The differences concern its nature, duration, and application. Three overlapping questions show the divide.
- Is the Son necessarily or contingently subordinate to the Father?
- Is this subordination eternal or temporary?
- Does this subordination describe the immanent or economic Trinity?
This table summarizes how the two positions answer these two questions.
| Nature | Duration | Application | |
|---|---|---|---|
| EFS | necessary | eternal | immanent and economic |
| EFE | contingent | temporary | economic only |
1.2. Explaining the Thesis
In this chapter, we argue that the philosophical arguments against hierarchy in the immanent Trinity do not succeed. While they sound compelling on the surface, they oversimplify complex issues, equivocate nuanced terminology, and gloss over crucial distinctions. Our goal is not to make a case for EFS. Others have already done that.8 Rather, we intend to demonstrate that the philosophical arguments against EFS do not stand up to careful scrutiny and fail to prove that hierarchy cannot exist in the immanent Trinity without compromising the Nicene doctrine of homoousion.
§ 2. An Examination of Three Arguments against Hierarchy in the Trinity
Numerous attempts have been made to demonstrate that EFS is philosophically indefensible.9 This articles focuses on three of the most common and seemingly devastating.
2.1. The eternal subordination of the Son to the Father entails the denial of homoousion.
2.1.1. Statement of the First Argument
Tom McCall and Keith Yandell argue that if EFS is true, then the Son possesses a property from eternity that the Father lacks (i.e., being subordinate to the Father). Consequently, the Father and the Son are not of the same essence (homoousioi), but of a different essence (heteroousioi); and historic, orthodox trinitarianism is lost. McCall asserts unambiguously, “Hard EFS entails the denial of the homoousion.”10
McCall develops the argument along these lines:
- If Hard EFS is true, then the Son has the property being functionally subordinate in all time segments in all possible worlds.
- If the Son has this property in every possible world, then the Son has this property necessarily. Furthermore, the Son has this property with de re rather than de dicto necessity.
- If the Son has this property necessarily (de re), then the Son has it essentially.
- If Hard EFS is true, then the Son has this property essentially while the Father does not.
- If the Son has this property essentially and the Father does not, then the Son is of a different essence than the Father. Thus the Son is heteroousios rather than homoousios.11
Millard Erickson states the same argument with less philosophical precision:
If authority over the Son is an essential, not an accidental, attribute of the Father, and subordination to the Father is an essential, not an accidental, attribute of the Son, then . . . [a]uthority is part of the Father’s essence, and subordination is part of the Son’s essence, and each attribute is not part of the essence of the other person. That means that the essence of the Son is different from the essence of the Father. . . . But that is equivalent to saying that they are not homoousious with one another.12
The essence of this argument is not new. German Catholic dogmatician Joseph Pohle wrestled with the force of this argument: “If the Trinitarian Properties are distinctive prerogatives of the Divine Persons separately, how can the Three be called co-equal? . . . [H]ow can the possession of relative perfections by any one Divine Person, exclusive of the other two, be harmonized with the Church’s teaching that the Three Persons are absolutely coequal?”13
2.1.2. Response to First Argument
On the surface this argument seems devastating to EFS. If metaphysics requires that eternal differences be necessary differences, and if necessary differences must find their grounding in ontological differences, then we are left with an inescapable ontological difference between the Father and the Son. If the Father and the Son are ontologically different—or different in their being, nature, or essence—then they cannot be homoousioi: of the same being, nature, or essence.
Our response to this argument is twofold. First, we will extend the argument and show the ramifications it has for historic orthodox trinitarianism. Second, we will critique the argument and shed light on its problems.
2.1.2.1. Extending the Argument
First, it is important to understand the ramifications of this argument, if it is indeed sound. Not only does it prove that the authority–submission distinction cannot coexist with full equality of essence between the Father and the Son in the immanent Trinity, but it also eliminates any property distinctions.14 In the same way, then, the historic doctrines of eternal generation of the Son and eternal procession of the Spirit, which have been embraced by the majority of the church in the East and the West since at least the Council of Nicaea in 32515—and arguably much earlier16—would entail the denial of homoousion.17
We could restate McCall’s argument this way:
- If the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity is true, then the Son has the property generate in all time segments in all possible worlds.
- If the Son has this property in every possible world, then the Son has this property necessarily. Furthermore, the Son has this property with de re rather than de dicto necessity.
- If the Son has this property necessarily (de re), then the Son has it essentially.
- If the historic doctrine of the Trinity is true, then the Son has this property essentially while the Father does not.
- If the Son has this property essentially and the Father does not, then the Son is of a different essence than the Father. Thus the Son is heteroousios rather than homoousios.
If this argument is valid, not only does it refute EFS’s proposal that the distinction between the Father and the Son is best understood in terms of authority and submission, but it refutes the view held by the vast majority of the church for at least the last 1,700 years: that Father, Son, and Spirit possessed unique personal properties that distinguished them from one another.18 The church’s best theologians, the very ones who established and defended homoousion, unknowingly denied it and differed only slightly from Arians. That is a weighty charge. If what McCall and Yandell are arguing is true, the entire history of orthodox trinitarianism must be consigned to heterodoxy for the simple reason that it entails a denial of homoousion.19
Fortunately, escaping the force of this argument does not require abandoning the historic teaching that the Father, Son, and Spirit each have one or more unique personal properties not possessed by the others.
2.1.2.2. Critiquing the Argument
The argument sounds compelling on the surface, but it falls apart under careful scrutiny. A necessary function does indeed find its grounding in one or more “essential” properties. So the Son’s eternal subordination to the Father in terms of his role or function in the Godhead derives from an “essential”20 difference between him and the Father. However, the church has historically distinguished between the one divine essence that Father, Son, and Spirit hold in common and the personal properties that make each person distinct from the others.21 The result is that each person, each property bearer, has two sets of properties: the properties of the one substantia or οὐσία and the properties of his unique persona, subsistentia, or ὑπόστασις.22 All of the properties of the one substantia or οὐσία belong equally to all three persons. The properties of the three personas, subsistentia, or ὑποστάσιες belong only to one of the three persons. As Calvin describes them, they are unique incommunicable properties.23 Vital to any discussion about properties in the Trinity is identifying whether the property belongs to the one substantia or οὐσία or one of the three personas, subsistentia, or ὑποστάσιες.
Unfortunately, McCall and Yandell repeatedly gloss over this crucial distinction and end up equivocating on the terms essentially and essence.24 In their view, so it seems, there is only one set of properties25—a clear departure from historic trinitarianism. Unfortunately, they never give a defense for this view or even acknowledged their departure from the historic trinitarianism.26 Once we remove the inherent ambiguity in the argument and eliminate the equivocation of essentially and essence, the conclusion becomes tautological.
McCall’s argument would be reformulated this way:
- If Hard EFS is true, then the Son has the property being functionally subordinate in all time segments in all possible worlds, not as God in the one shared substantia or οὐσία but as Son in his unique persona, subsistentia, or ὑπόστασις.
- If the Son has this property in every possible world, then the Son has this property necessarily. Furthermore, the Son has this property with de re rather than de dicto necessity.
- If the Son has this property necessarily (de re), then the Son has it essentially not as God in the one shared substantia or οὐσία but as Son in his unique persona, subsistentia, or ὑπόστασις.
- If Hard EFS is true, then the Son has this property essentially, not as God in the one shared substantia or οὐσία but as Son in his unique persona, subsistentia, or ὑπόστασις, while the Father does not have it in his unique persona, subsistentia, or ὑπόστασις.
- If the Son has this property essentially in his unique persona, subsistentia, or ὑπόστασις and the Father does not have it in his unique persona, subsistentia, or ὑπόστασις, then the Son is a different person than the Father.
With the ambiguity and equivocation removed, the argument proves nothing profound: the Father and the Son are not the same person—one of the basic tenets of trinitarianism.
John Feinberg articulates this important distinction in a discussion on “each member of the Godhead’s non-incarnational property”:
The church, as we noted, said that the Father is ungenerate and that he begets the Son. The Son’s property is being eternally begotten by the Father, and the Holy Spirit’s property is his procession from the Father (or Father and Son). Given these respective properties, if we are speaking about the sortal noun “deity” or the adjective “divine,” we seem to have a problem, according to Bartel, for we can now write an argument like the following:
God the Son is eternally begotten of the Father qua divine.
God the Father is not eternally begotten of the Father qua divine;
Therefore, God the Son is not the same deity as God the Father.If Jesus and the Father are numerically the same God, this argument underscores the problem. As Bartel explains, “just as absolute identity will not tolerate divergence in properties exemplified simpliciter, so being numerically the same f as will not tolerate divergence in properties exemplified qua f.”
This may seem to be an insuperable dilemma, but Bartel thinks not, and I agree. . . . The reason is that being eternally begotten and eternally proceeding are not properties the Son and Spirit have in virtue of being divine, but in virtue of being distinct subsistences of that divine essence. Hence, the premises of the above should read “qua subsistence or person,” and the conclusion should say, “Therefore, God the Son is not the same person or subsistence as God the Father.”27
In the view of Grudem and Ware, being in authority over inheres in what it means for the Father to be Father, not in what it means for the Father to be God; and being in submission under inheres in what it means for the Son to be Son, not in what it means for the Son to be God. As such, these are not properties of the one essence but unique incommunicable properties of the persons that define their intratrinitarian relationships.28
As we have argued29—and Bartel and Feinberg agree—properties that inhere in the persons and not in the essence do not entail a denial of homoousion. Consequently, by affirming the eternal generation of the Son and the eternal procession of the Spirit, the church has not been unknowingly denying homoousion since Nicaea. Neither, then, would other properties inherent in the persons, like authority over and submission under, entail the denial of homoousion.30
One other option for evading the conclusion of the argument is to follow Pohle’s lead. As we saw earlier, Pohle wrestled with how “the possession of relative perfections by any one Divine Person, exclusive of the other two, [can] be harmonized with the Church’s teaching that the Three Persons are absolutely coequal.”31 For Pohle the solution is found in the doctrine of perichoresis.32 He argues that “each of the Three Divine Persons is absolutely and really identical with the Divine Nature” and that “[t]his absolute identity cannot but extend to the relative perfections possessed by each.” The result is that “whatever of true perfection there is in the Divine Essence, is participated in by all Three Divine Persons severally and in consort.”33 He goes on,
While it is true that no one Person can, without sacrificing His identity, surrender His peculiar prerogative to the others, it is also certain that each Person, besides His own, also possesses, equivalently, though not formally, the relative perfections of the other two. . . . By virtue of their mutual immanence or inexistence (περιχώρησις), the Three Divine Persons communicate to one another quasiformaliter even their relative prerogatives or Properties. The Father bears within Himself the Son and the Holy Ghost as the intrinsic terminus of His notional understanding and love; while, conversely, the Son and the Holy Ghost share in the relative perfection of Paternity by virtue of their immanence in the Father,—that is, so far as the Hypostatic differences between the Divine Persons allow.34
While perichoresis is a helpful addition to this discussion, we find the first solution to be more satisfactory and sufficient to escape the charge that EFS entails a denial of homoousion.
Upon closer examination, this argument fails to prove that properties unique to one person are inconsistency with full equality of deity.35
2.2. If only the Son could have become incarnate, the Father cannot be omnipotent.
2.2.1. Statement of the Second Argument
Another argument against EFS concerns which of the persons of the Trinity could have taken on a human nature and become incarnate. Was it possible for the Father or the Spirit to have come instead of the Son? McCall maintains that the answer must be yes, that is, unless one is prepared to deny the attribute of omnipotence to both the Father and the Spirit. He reasons that if the Father was incapable of being united to humanity, then He necessarily lacks something that the Son possesses. And this constitutes, again, a Father and a Son who are not equally divine—the result being a sort of reverse Arianism, where the Son has more power than the Father. In other words, maintaining that any of the three persons of the Trinity could have become incarnate is necessary to preserve homoousion.
McCall states the argument this way:
If only the Son has the property possibly being incarnate (and has it essentially), then the Son again has an essential property that the Father does not have. So once again we are faced with a Son who is not homoousios with the Father. In addition, it seems that the Father and Son are not even of the same generic divine essence on this account. For if the defense of Hard EFS goes in this direction, then the Father and Son do not share the property of omnipotence: on this account the Father would be limited in his abilities to perform actions that are logically possible (i.e., becoming incarnate), even actions that are possible for a morally perfect being—thus the Father would be less than omnipotent. And if the Father does not have the property or attribute of omnipotence, then surely the Father does not have the whole generic divine essence. Thus the Father and the Son are not homoousios—even with respect to a generic divine essence.36
McCall points to Aquinas as a theologian who insisted “that any of the divine persons could have become incarnate”37 and cites Richard Cross that “this view is held by virtually everyone in medieval Christology.”38
2.2.2. Response to Second Argument
Like the first argument, this argument seems compelling on the surface. If only the Son could have become incarnate, then the Son indeed has an ability that the Father and Spirit lack, resulting in ontological inequality.
First, we must look at what proponents of EFS actually claim. Are they really saying that the Father and the Spirit lack a property that the Son possesses—that it is not even theoretically possible for the Father or the Spirit to be united to human flesh? And do they have in mind a theoretical incarnation or the Incarnation with all that it entails? It does not seem that the view as stated by Grudem,39 Ware,40 Köstenberger and Swain,41 or Reymond42 requires McCall’s reading, that is, that the Father and the Spirit lacked the property necessary for a theoretical incarnation.43 In fact, we cannot find anyone who states the view the way McCall represents it. If that is not the view of hierarchical trinitarians, then what is?
Aquinas’s discussion points to the answer. For Aquinas there are two separate issues: what is possible and what is fitting.
First, Aquinas insists, “Whatever the Son can do, so can the Father and the Holy Ghost, otherwise the power of the three Persons would not be one. But the Son was able to become incarnate. Therefore the Father and the Holy Ghost were able to become incarnate.” He continues, “the Divine power could have united human nature to the Person of the Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the Person of the Son. And hence we must say that the Father or the Holy Ghost could have assumed flesh even as the Son.”44
McCall thinks this conflicts with the EFS position, and by itself it might appear to. But the conclusion is not warranted for two reasons: Aquinas’s view is more sophisticated than this narrow reading suggests, and the EFS position agrees with Aquinas’s conclusions.
Aquinas goes on to address “whether it was more fitting that the person of the Son rather than any other divine person should assume human nature.” After a lengthy discussion with numerous reasons, he concludes emphatically that “[i]t was most fitting that the Person of the Son should become incarnate.”45
McCall glosses over this important distinction in his discussion and misunderstands the view of his opponents. But Aquinas’s conclusion is precisely what EFS proponents affirm: the unique fitness of the Son for the work of the Incarnation. All three persons of the Trinity have the capacity to be united to a human nature, and therefore from a strictly theoretical standpoint could have become incarnate. They all equally possess the property of omnipotence. However, to acknowledge this is not inconsistent with maintaining that in all possible worlds in which one of the persons of the Trinity would have become incarnate for the work of the Incarnation that the Son must be that person.46 This conclusion is the necessary consequence of God’s wisdom.
The unique personal properties of the Son make him best suited to be united to human nature and fulfill the role of mediator. It is a matter of fitness, not ability. However, we can safely conclude that in all possible worlds that include the biblical Incarnation the Son rather than the Father or the Spirit would have become incarnate because God’s nature is such that he always does what is most fitting. The Incarnation corresponds to something in the Son, making his incarnation a necessary consequence of divine wisdom.47 So while any person could have become incarnate with reference to capacity or ability, only the Son could have with reference to God’s commitment to choosing the most fitting means to accomplish His purposes for the Incarnation.
We could state the argument in a syllogism this way:
- Although all three persons of the Trinity possess the properties necessary to being united with human nature, it was most fitting for the Son to become incarnate in all possible worlds containing the biblical Incarnation.
- The Triune God is eternally, necessarily, and infinitely wise, and it is not possible for him to cease to be wise or to act in a fashion inconsistent with that wisdom.
- God’s wisdom entails his choosing the most fitting means to accomplish his purposes.
- Therefore, it was not possible for any person but the Son to have become incarnate to accomplish the work of redemption planned for the biblical Incarnation.
The view that only the Son would become incarnate to accomplish the work of redemption planned for the Incarnation is consistent with the insistence that the Father and the Spirit had the ability to be united with a human nature. Thus, all three persons are homoousioi, yet one of those persons, based on his personal properties and relationships to the other two, was best suited for the work of redemption in the Incarnation.
2.3. If the Son’s submission to the Father indicates an eternal relationship of submission, then the Son’s submission to the Spirit also does.
2.3.1. Statement of the Third Argument
To establish their view that the Son is eternally and necessarily subordinate to the Father from all eternity, Grudem and Ware point to the numerous places in Scripture where the Father sends the Son into the world. This sending, they say, demonstrates an authority–submission relationship—one that existed prior to the Incarnation and, by extension, from all eternity.
McCall and Yandell take issue with the presumption that such sending indicates an eternal and necessary relationship.48 Instead of proving their case, Ware and Grudem have made a logical leap from what was at a point in time to what must be at all points of time. Though they consider the premise unproved, McCall and Yandell argue that by granting the premise the argument turns into “outright contradiction” or proof of “mutual submission within the Trinity.”49
They state the argument this way:
- If one divine person sends another, then the divine person sent is eternally and necessarily subordinate to the divine person who sends (Grudem’s premise);
- The Son is sent by the Spirit (Matt. 4:1; Mark 1:12; Luke 4:1);
- Therefore, the Son is eternally and necessarily subordinate to the Spirit.50
The minor premise is undisputed. If the major premise is true, it proves not only that the Son is eternally and necessarily subordinate to the Father, but that the Son is also likewise subordinate to the Spirit (and the Spirit is likewise subordinate to the Son). The problems are obvious. It breaks the order of Father, Son, Spirit and results in a contradiction where the Son and the Spirit are both under each other, whatever that might mean. As McCall and Yandell point out, one could try to resort to some notion of mutual subordination between the Son and the Spirit (much like the egalitarian’s interpretation of Eph 5:21). But it is not clear whether such a move would be successful.
2.3.2. Response to the Third Argument
On the surface this argument seems to pose a problem for EFS. At the very least, it requires reordering the persons of the Trinity so that the Father is first and the Son and the Spirit are equally subordinate to the Father and to each other.51 The Father sends the Son and the Spirit; therefore, the Son and the Spirit are subordinate to the Father. No one sends the Father; therefore, the Father is not subordinate to anyone. The Son and the Spirit send each other; therefore, the Son and the Spirit are subordinate to each other.
This reordering, even if it were to work, is not necessary. Evaluating the argument more carefully provides a simpler solution. McCall and Yandell gloss over important differences. The argument breaks down based on the differences between the Son’s being sent by the Father52 and his being sent by the Spirit.53 They are fundamentally different, as the data bear out.
First, only the Father is said to send the Son before the Incarnation. The Spirit is never said to send the Son into the world. Second, we must not overlook the crucial difference between the one sent by the Father and the one sent by the Spirit. The Father sends the Son before he has taken on a human nature. The Spirit sends the Son after he has been hypostatically united to his human nature. The Spirit does not send the Son as God, the second person of the Trinity. Furthermore, never does the Spirit send the Son; instead, he sends Jesus. The Spirit sends Jesus as the God-man. It was in his role as mediator, the Second Adam, that Jesus was sent by and submitted to the Spirit. As the God-man, Jesus remained hierarchically over the Spirit throughout the Incarnation.54
By overlooking this difference, McCall and Yandell construct a counterargument that simply will not stand up to nuanced evaluation.
In light of these qualifications, we would need to revise the argument and state it this way:
- If one divine person sends another as a divine person, then the divine person sent is eternally and necessarily subordinate to the divine person who sends.
- The Son is sent by the Spirit as a human person, not as a divine person.
- Therefore, it does not follow that the Son is eternally and necessarily subordinate to the Spirit.55
We must conclude, then, that this third argument, like the others, fails to prove its conclusion.56
§ 3. Conclusion
The point of this essay has not been to make a positive case for EFS or to refute EFE. Rather, it has been to evaluate three prominent arguments that attempt to demonstrate the philosophical incoherence of EFS. As we have seen, these arguments lack appropriate nuance, blur the crucial distinctions, oversimplify the issues, and represent a misunderstanding the opposing position. While there might be good reasons for questioning whether hierarchy exists in the immanent Trinity,57 these three arguments are not among them.
While it is not within the express scope of this chapter to make a positive statement for a particular view, we would like to suggest a way forward for both sides.
Both positions, in our view, deviate to varying degrees from historic trinitarianism. EFE, at least some versions of it, eliminates any real property distinctions among the persons of the Trinity. This is a clear departure from what the church has believed since at least Nicaea. If that indeed is what EFE proponents wish to do, they should say as much. If it is not, they need to abandon their arguments.
EFS is, in our view, more consistent with historic trinitarianism. However, defining the difference between the Father and the Son in terms of authority and submission goes beyond the normal language the church has used. While the way the Father and the Son relate in the immanent Trinity seems to include a relational ordering or hierarchy, which may have implications for the way authority and submission are carried out, we think it wise to proceed with caution and heed the words of Calvin as we ponder those differences:
[T]he Scriptures demonstrate that there is some distinction between the Father and the Word, the Word and the Spirit; but the magnitude of the mystery reminds us of the great reverence and soberness which ought to be employed in discussing it. It seems to me, that nothing can be more admirable than the words of Gregory Nanzianzen: “Ὀυ φθάνω το ἓι νοῆσαι, καὶ τοῖς τρισὶ περιλάμπομαι οὐ φθάνω τὰ τρία διελε͂ιν καὶ εὶς τὸ ἑν ἀναφέρομαι,” (Greg. Nanzian. in Serm. de Sacro Baptis.) “I cannot think of the unity without being irradiated by the Trinity: I cannot distinguish between the Trinity without being carried up to the unity.” Therefore, let us beware of imagining such a Trinity of persons as will distract our thoughts, instead of bringing them instantly back to the unity.
. . .
Here, if any where, in considering the hidden mysteries of Scripture, we should speculate soberly and with great moderation, cautiously guarding against allowing either our mind or our tongue to go a step beyond the confines of God’s word. 58
As we continue to debate these important matters, let us keep these words of Calvin close at hand.
Notes
1. Charges of heresy, tampering with the Trinity, and rejecting historic, orthodox trinitarianism run both ways. Bruce Ware sounded the alarm in “Tampering with the Trinity: Does the Son Submit to His Father?” Journal for Biblical Manhood and Womanhood 6, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 4–11. Kevin Giles responded in The Trinity and Subordinationism: The Doctrine of God and the Contemporary Gender Debate (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2002), accusing complementarian trinitarians of rejecting the tradition, heading off on their own, and being dangerously close to Arianism. In Jesus and the Father: Modern Evangelicals Reinvent the Doctrine of the Trinity (Grand Rapids: Zondervan: 2006), he accuses complementarians of reinventing the doctrine of the Trinity. Cf. Millard J. Erickson, Who’s Tampering with the Trinity? An Assessment of the Subordination Debate (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2009), who essentially sides with the egalitarian trinitarians. In the 2008 Trinity Debate, both sides compared the other’s position to Arianism or Modalism. ↩
2. E.g., Rebecca Merrill Groothuis, “‘Equal in Being, Unequal in Role’: Exploring the Logic of Woman’s Subordination,” in Discovering Biblical Equality: Complementarity without Hierarchy, ed. Ronald W. Pierce and Rebecca Merrill Groothuis (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2004), 301–33. ↩
3. Both sides appeal to church history to support their view and argue that their opponents view is a departure from historical trinitarianism. E.g., Giles, The Trinity and Subordinationism, 21–117; Ware, McCall, and Yandell in the Trinity Debate. Cf. Erickson, “Historical Considerations,” chapter 5 of Who’s Tampering with the Trinity?, 139–68. ↩
4. See Bruce A. Ware, Wayne A. Grudem, Thomas McCall, and Keith Yandell. “Do Relations of Authority and Submission Exist Eternally among the Persons of the Godhead?” audio debate, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School Chapel, Deerfield, Illinois, October 9, 2008. http://www.henrycenter.org/media/?id=154&type=lect; Thomas McCall and Keith E. Yandell, “On Trinitarian Subordinationism,” Philosophia Christi 11, no. 2 (2009): 339–58; Millard J. Erickson, “The Philosophical Issues,” chapter 6 of Who’s Tampering with the Trinity?, 169–93; Thomas McCall, “‘Eternal Functional Subordination’: Considering a Recent Evangelical Proposal,” in Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? Philosophical and Systematic Theologians on the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 175–88. ↩
5. Sources on the exegetical, theological, and historical levels. ↩
6. Proponents of this view include Wayne Grudem, Bruce Ware, Robert Letham, Tom Schreiner, John Piper, etc. Olson, but denies that hierarchy necessitates authority and submission. He instead says that the hierarchy is only a matter of source. ↩
7. Tom McCall, Keith Yandell, Millard Erickson, Kevin Giles, Rebecca Groothius, Gilbert Bilezikian, etc. There are, of course, various shades of views. And some seem to take more of an agnostic stance. ↩
8. Sources defending EFS. ↩
9. Cf. n4. ↩
10. “Eternal Functional Subordination,” 179. McCall strangely distinguishes between Soft EFS and Hard EFS. Soft EFS is not EFS at all; rather, it is equivalent to EFE. Hard EFS is EFS as we have defined it previously. ↩
11. Ibid, 179–80. ↩
12. Who’s Tampering with the Trinity?, 172. Others have made a similar argument, that eternal functional subordination must also be eternal ontological subordination. Gilbert Bilezikian claims, “[I]f Christ’s subordination is eternal . . . , it is also ontological.” “Hermeneutical Bungee-Jumping: Subordination in the Godhead,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 40, no. 1 (1997): 64. Adam Omelianchuk argues, “[S]ubordination that extends into eternity cannot be merely functional, but must also be ontological. . . . [I]f the Son is eternally subordinate to the Father, then the Father has a divine attribute that the Son does not have. And since eternity is an intrinsic quality of God’s existence, it logically follows that what the Son is eternally, he is in being. If the Son is eternally subordinate in function, then he is eternally subordinate in being.” “The Logic of Equality,” Priscilla Papers 22, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 27. ↩
13. The Divine Trinity: A Dogmatic Treatise, trans. Arthur Preuss, 2nd ed. (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder, 1915), 238–39. ↩
14. Yandell seems to recognize this and argues that the Father, Son, and Spirit possess identical properties. There is no property that one person possesses that the others do not also possess. What differentiates the Father, Son, and Spirit is not one or more properties. Rather, it is that they are distinct property bearers and centers of self-consciousness. Yandell does acknowledge the distinction of the existence-entailed properties being the Father, being the Son, and being the Spirit (Trinity Debate, 2:20:30–21:30; “On Trinitarian Subordination,” 354). However, these do not amount to real differences between the persons. Rather, they are merely ways of identifying that they are distinct property bearers. For a definition and discussion of existence-entailed properties, see Keith A. Yandell, “A Defense of Dualism,” in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, ed. William Lane Craig (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 482–3. ↩
15. The Nicene creed reads, “We believe . . . in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, begotten from the Father before all ages, light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, of one substance with the Father. . . .” ↩
16. The doctrine in its seed form permeates the writings of Ignatius (c. 30–107), Tertullian (160–255), and a host of others who predate Nicaea. Rather than talking about eternal generation, they refer to the Son’s generation “before time began,” “before the beginning of time,” “before every creature,” “before all things,” “before creation,” etc. For the history of the doctrine of eternal generation, see Kevin Giles, “The Eternal Generation of the Son: From the Apologists to Athanasius,” in The Eternal Generation of the Son: Maintaining Orthodoxy in Trinitarian Theology (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2012), 91–120; Maurice Wiles, “Eternal Generation,” Journal of Theological Studies n.s. 12, no. 2 (October 1961): 284–91. ↩
17. Strangely, McCall ignores the implications of his argument and even suggests that belief in eternal generation might allow one to escape the force of his argument (“Eternal Functional Subordination,” 180–81). However, in a later publication, McCall and Yandell seem aware of this extension, but oddly speak of it only in terms of possibility: “the doctrine of eternal generation . . . perhaps even entails ontological subordinationism” (“On Trinitarian Subordinationism,” 350). Why they are not as confident of their arguments force against eternal generation as they are with the authority–submission properties is not clear. Perhaps it is the audacity of the claim and its ramifications. ↩
18. A growing number of theologians reject the historic doctrines of eternal generation and procession (e.g., Loraine Boettner, J. Oliver Buswell, William Lane Craig, Millard Erickson, John Feinberg, Paul Helm, Robert Reymond, Keith Yandell), but most still retain the eternal identity of Father, Son, and Spirit and the eternal distinctions they entail. This argument, if successful, would charge those who maintain any eternal (non-existence-entailing) property distinctions, even if not eternal generation and eternal procession, of entailing a denial of homoousion as well. ↩
19. It is beyond the scope of this article to prove that the church has historically affirmed that the Father, Son, and Spirit each possessed one or more personal properties that make them distinct from one another. But we point to two representative examples. Aquinas maintained, “As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other.” STh, I q.39 a.1 ad.2. Calvin defines person this way: “a subsistence in the Divine essence,—a subsistence which, while related to the other two, is distinguished from them by incommunicable properties.” Each subsistence, “though connected with the essence by an indissoluble tie, being incapable of separation, yet has a special mark by which it is distinguished from it.” He refers to “the peculiar property of each [that] distinguishes the one from the other,” and maintains that “each of the three subsistences while related to the others is distinguished by its own properties.” Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Edinburgh: The Calvin Translation Society, 1845), 1:153, emphasis added. Elsewhere he asserts that “the Father differs in some special property from the Son, and the Son from the Spirit” (173). Calvin’s view of personal properties is not unique. Rather, at its heart it is representative of the historic trinitarianism. However, according to Yandell, McCall, and Erickson, it would necessarily entail a denial of homoousion. ↩
20. The use of the word essential is problematic because of the use of essence to refer to the oneness of God. However, the personal properties are eternal, necessary, and essential to each of the persons, yet unique and incommunicable to the other persons. Some use the word essence to talk about the seat of these personal properties, but we find it be to reserve the word essence for the one shared essence to avoid confusion. ↩
21. See n19. ↩
22. Consequently, there are four sets of properties in the Trinity: (1) the properties of the one substantia or οὐσία, (2) the properties of the Father’s unique persona, subsistentia, or ὑποστάσις, (3) the properties of the Son’s unique persona, subsistentia, or ὑποστάσις, and (4) the properties of the Spirit’s unique persona, subsistentia, or ὑποστάσις. ↩
23. See n19. ↩
24. This is in spite of Ware’s repeated attempts to make this point in the Trinity Debate. ↩
25. In the 2008 Trinity Debate, Yandell repeatedly indicated that the three persons had no properties not in common with the others. What makes them distinct is not their properties, but simply that they are unique bearers of properties. At one point, however, he acknowledged that they each have one unique property: being the Father, being the Son, and being the Spirit. However, for Yandell, these amount to existence-entailed properties, not essential properties. Being the Father means nothing more than being a distinct property bearer. There is no place for a property that is not a property of the one substantia or οὐσία. McCall’s view, while not as clear, seems to be similar. ↩
26. They did, however, admit to rejecting eternal generation and eternal procession. However, that does not entail rejecting any personal properties that differentiate Father, Son, and Spirit, which we maintain is the historic view of the church. ↩
27. “Logic and the Doctrine of the Trinity,” in No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God, Foundations of Evangelical Theology (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001), 494–95. Emphasis added in the last paragraph. ↩
28. Erickson, aware of this counterargument, maintains that differentiating between properties of the essence and properties of the persons does not solve the problem, “because if these are necessary properties of the persons, then the persons have different essences.” Who’s Tampering with the Trinity?, 173. It is astounding that a theologian of Erickson’s caliber could make such a sloppy and dismissive statement. It is sloppy because it confuses the properties of the essence with properties of the persons. It is dismissive because it entails a rejection of a key component of 1,700 years of orthodox trinitarianism. While the church has affirmed that the three persons possessed one or more unique incommunicable properties not proper to the others, Erickson makes it sound as if this view originated with Bruce Ware and Wayne Grudem. McCall comes close to anticipating this counter-argument when he says, “[Ware and Grudem] might want to hold both to a generic divine essence (the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, etc.) and to individual or personal essences that are functional (i.e., the Father’s individual essence is made up of properties such as having authority over, while the Son’s individual essence is made up of such properties as being subordinate), but it is not obvious that they can do even this” (“Eternal Functional Subordination,” 181). Unfortunately, McCall never gives any reasons why this will not work. ↩
29. Bruce Ware made this argument in his counter statement in the Trinity debate and then again in “Alleging Heresy Where There Is None,” a review of Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? Philosophical and Systemic Theologians on the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology, by Thomas H. McCall, Journal on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood (Fall 2011): 42–46. ↩
30. Of course, we have not proved that the properties being in authority over and being in submission under are properties of the persons rather than the essence. But we have proved that the argument fails without first establishing that such is not the case. ↩
31. The Divine Trinity, 239. ↩
32. Perichoresis (περιχώρησις) is the mutual indwelling of the persons of the Trinity. The doctrine preserves the full equality of the persons, who all share equally the one divine nature, without blurring their individual identities or personal distinctions. Both oneness and threeness are fully affirmed. Synonymous terms include circumincession (lat. circumincessio), interpenetration, and coinherence. ↩
33. Ibid. ↩
34. Ibid, 239–40. ↩
35. For this argument to succeed, its proponents need to demonstrate one of two things: (1) that the historic position of properties of the persons as distinct from properties of the one essence is flawed and that all properties are properties of the one essence, or (2) that the authority–submission properties must be properties of the essence rather than the persons. To our knowledge, they have done neither. ↩
36. “Eternal Functional Subordination,” 182. ↩
37. Ibid. He references STh, 3a, q.1–3. ↩
38. Ibid. He points readers to The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 179. ↩
39. To our knowledge, Grudem never addresses the issue explicitly. Rather, he maintains that the “roles [of the Father’s sending and the Son’s obeying] could not have been reversed or the Father would have ceased to be the Father and the Son would have ceased to be the Son” (Systematic Theology, 250). ↩
40. Need to find the best statement from Ware. ↩
41. “To the perennial dogmatic question ‘Could any person of the Trinity have become incarnate?’ John’s Gospel says ‘No!’: that is, if the incarnation entails fulfilling the role of ‘Servant of Yahweh’ at the climax of Israel’s history. Only the Son could do that.” Andreas J. Köstenberger and Scott R. Swain, Father, Son and Spirit: The Trinity and John’s Gospel, New Studies in Biblical Theology 24, ed. D. A. Carson (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2008),126n64. ↩
42. “We know also that his Sonship implies an order of relational (not essential) subordination to the Father (which is doubtless what dictated the divisions of labor in the eternal Covenant of Redemption) in that it is unthinkable that the Son would have sent the Father to do his will.” A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, 2nd ed. (Nashville: Nelson, 1998), 341. ↩
43. Ware denied that position in the 2008 Trinity Debate. Yet McCall continued to argue against the position his opponents denied holding. ↩
44. STh, III q.3 a.5 resp. ↩
45. STh, III q.3 a.8 resp. ↩
46. Consequently, in a different sense, it was not possible for the Father or the Spirit to become incarnate in any possible world in which there would exist the Incarnation—not because of a lack of ability in the Father or the Son, but because of the Son’s fitness and God’s wisdom. ↩
47. We are not claiming that the Incarnation was necessary, but that, given the Incarnation, the Son’s (and not the Father’s or Spirit’s) incarnation was necessary. ↩
48. “On Trinitarian Subordinationism,” 344–46. ↩
49. Ibid, 345. ↩
50. Ibid. ↩
51. It is unclear if this kind of mutual submission even works. ↩
52. The Father sends the Son into the world. The NT mentions this event at least fifty times (with varying degrees of specificity), each time using a form of the word ἀποστέλλω or πέμπω. The only exception is Gal 4:4, which uses ἐξαποστέλλω. Forty-three instances are in John’s writings: his gospel (40x) and his first letter (3x). The other seven are in Matthew (1x), Mark (1x), Luke (4x), and Galatians (1x). ↩
53. The Spirit sends Jesus into the wilderness, an account which is recorded in Matt. 4:1; Mark 1:12; and Luke 4:1. The Greek words used are ἀνήχθη from ἀνάγω, meaning to lead or bring up; ἐκβάλλει from ἐκβάλλω, meaning to send or bring out or away; and ἤγετο from ἄγω, meaning to lead or encourage (in the direction of). BDAG. ↩
54. It is also worth noting that the Father’s sending and the Son’s sending are never described with the same word. But it’s not necessary to develop this point in order to refute the argument. ↩
55. McCall and Yandell respond that if we explain the temporary subordination of the Son to the Spirit in light of the Son’s human nature, why should we not also explain the subordination of the Son to the Father in the same light? The answer to this is simple: the Scriptural data demonstrates the order of Father, Son, and Spirit before and after the incarnation, so that the Son’s subordination is consistent with it while the Son’s subordination to the Spirit is a deviation. ↩
56. McCall and Yandell are right to point out the logical leaps in Grudem’s and Ware’s arguments, where they assumption their conclusions without proving them. However, their counterargument only serves unhelpfully to draw attention away from that legitimate concern. ↩
57. B. B. Warfield’s approach, while not conclusive, is more successful. “Trinity,” The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, ed. James Orr (Chicago: Howard-Severance, 1915), 5:3,020–21. ↩
58. Institutes I, xiii, 17, 21. Calvin continues, “[I]t is far safer to rest contented with the relation as taught by [Augustine], than get bewildered in vain speculation by subtle prying into a sublime mystery” (19). “[W]e must conceive of him as he has made himself known, and in our inquiries make application to no other quarter than his word.” Calvin implores his readers “to bring more docility than acumen to the discussion of this question, never to attempt to search after God anywhere but in his sacred word, and never to speak or think of him farther than we have it for our guide. But if the distinction of Father, Son, and Spirit, subsisting in the one Godhead, (certainly a subject of great difficulty,) gives more trouble and annoyance to some intellects than is meet, let us remember that the human mind enters a labyrinth whenever it indulges its curiosity, and thus submit to be guided by the divine oracles, how much soever the mystery may be beyond our reach” (21). ↩